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Reformations 
The Reformations of the 1530s and thereafter were the most significant extrinsic shock 
experienced by English society between the Black Death and the Civil Wars of the 1640s. 
The magnitude of the shock has never been in doubt. What is now clear, however, is the 
extent to which it was genuinely extrinsic. England’s religious life until the late 1520s was 
remarkably stable. There were, naturally, fault lines and points of stress, and when the 
earthquake came, they marked some of the points at which the old structure fractured. Yet 
they did not cause it. This crisis came on England unawares, and it came in two distinct 
forms: a political and an intellectual assault, often but not always in alliance with each other. 
Between them, they remade English society. This chapter will sketch out the landscape that 
they struck before discussing some of the ways they changed it, and how the English 
responded to, adapted to and resisted the new world in which they found themselves. 
 Pre-Reformation English religion has been a playground for modern prejudices, too 
easily depicted either as a swamp of superstition and corruption or as a timeless, bucolic 
paradise of community and simple faith. We do not need to accept either caricature to 
recognise that, in its own terms, it was working fairly well. By European standards, the 
English Church was unusually well-disciplined and well-led. It was able to provide 
sacramental, pastoral and practical services to its people which were generally adequate, even 
if they fell far short of the Church’s own sometimes wildly unrealistic ideals. There were 
plenty of frictions over predictable matters of land, money and law, but none of this seems to 
have coalesced into the sort of more widespread anticlerical prejudice which was common in 
contemporary Germany, Scotland or elsewhere. Instead, the Church drew on – and 
replenished – a deep well of legitimacy and affection. The signs of this cycle of loyalty can 
be seen in the consistent support for all manner of local ecclesiastical services provided by 
both the living and the dying of all classes, whether in money, in kind or in effort. 
 The balance between love for this establishment, contented conformity to it, 
disgruntled compliance with it and alienated withdrawal from it is, by its nature, hard to 
establish. It is clear, however, that open dissent was very rare. Since the expulsion of the 
English Jews in 1291, England had been religiously uniform in law, and not too far from it in 
fact. A very few foreign Jews apparently did find a home in London at times, remaining 
virtually invisible.
1
 There were a few sceptics, scoffers and freethinkers, often motivated by 
individual grievances, who – for the Church – were no more than a minor disciplinary 
irritant. A rather more substantial irritant was the loose movement of dissidents who called 
each other ‘brethren’ or ‘known men’, but who were known to their orthodox neighbours and 
are still known to historians as the Lollards. This scabrously anti-ceremonial and anti-
hierarchical movement was vaguely attached to the memory of the fourteenth-century Oxford 
theologian John Wyclif, but retained little of his particular doctrines beyond a passionate 
commitment to the English Bible: the practice of this religion apparently consisted chiefly in 
clandestine meetings to read the Bible and other sermons or texts aloud. Otherwise, Lollards 
generally conformed outwardly to the public Church, albeit with some misgivings and with 
occasional, sometimes startlingly obscene outbursts of scorn at its practices. Periodically 
some bishops took it upon themselves to try to root out these heretics, whereupon most of 
those arrested readily recanted their errors and returned home to carry on. Although repeat 
offenders did face burning alive, the numbers remained low. Lollardy was a low-level, 
endemic presence in a handful of southern English regions, notably the cities of London, 
Bristol, Coventry and surrounding rural areas, and in particular the Chiltern hills of 
Buckinghamshire, the closest thing it had to a heartland. But its chief significance even in 
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those regions was indirect. It primed the English Church and people to be aware of heresy, 
one simple sign of which is that ‘heretic’ and ‘Lowler’ were widely used as all-purpose 
insults almost devoid of specific meaning. 
 This was not the most promising terrain for the Protestant Reformation to take root. 
As everywhere in Europe, certain small but important social groups showed an early interest 
in the religious novelties coming out of Germany: merchants whose travels exposed them to 
foreign ways, scholars struck by the appeal of Luther’s ideas. That persistent Lollard minority 
showed some interest too. But that hardly made the new heresies dangerous. As the 
formidable machinery of the English church and state began to mobilise behind orthodoxy in 
the late 1520s, it made sense to expect that this movement would at worst become another 
annoyingly persistent minority, and at best would be squelched altogether. 
 In the event, however, the state threw its weight on the other side of the balance, and 
this turned out to be decisive. King Henry VIII’s marital and dynastic crisis, and his bloodily 
quixotic solution to it, merged improbably with the new religious movement to take England 
into unexplored territory. A ratchet of legislation between 1529 and 1536 successively 
restricted the privileges of the English clergy, broke the legal threads connecting the English 
church to Rome, and asserted that the king was supreme head, immediately under Christ, of 
the Church of England: a sententious title, made more ominous by the regime’s refusal to 
define exactly what it might mean. 
 The assertion of that title in 1534 is usually taken to be a decisive turning-point, and 
sometimes counted as the foundation-date of the independent Church of England, but at first 
relatively few English subjects took much notice. Rumours of the king’s marital adventures 
had been widely circulated, but the first change actually to affect the parishes was some 
amendments to the liturgy. Hitherto the Pope had been prayed for daily at Mass, both in Latin 
and in English: now he was not to be mentioned, and scratched out of the service books. In 
the canon of the Mass, the prayer for pope, bishop and king became (or often became, for 
there was no uniform policy) a prayer for king and bishop. These were on one level minor 
tweaks, but, given the conservative familiarity of liturgy, impossible not to notice.
2
 
 Following close behind was a more momentous imposition: royal commissioners 
requiring all adult males in England to swear an oath acknowledging the king’s new marriage 
and disavowing his first, on pain of treason. (A second oath, acknowleding the king’s newly-
discovered supremacy over the Church, was administered much more sparingly, and almost 
exclusively to clergy.) Virtually no-one resisted. It was not a matter to die for. But the sheer 
oddity of the policy – subjects were not normally required to consent to a royal marriage – 
was a sign that England was in uncharted waters. The entire population was being 
conscripted to, and implicated in, forging a new religio-political identity. Henry VIII and 
Thomas Cromwell doubtless did not see themselves as enfranchising the population, but they 
were creating, or acknowledging, an unprecedented variety of popular politics.
3
 
 Other clues began to materialise in the parishes as the months went past. Old taxes 
(‘Peter’s Pence’) vanished; new, more arduous dues took their place. Preachers (an 
occasional presence in most parishes) obediently extolled the king’s supremacy, and some, 
more daringly, questioned the value or even the legitimacy of the old ceremonies and 
sacraments. Royal commissioners nosed into every church, asking questions about money 
and property, and sparking galloping rumours. Change, and fear, was in the air. 
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 In 1536 some of the rumours came true, in what was, for most English people, the 
defining event of the Reformation: the dissolution of the monasteries. No other event of the 
sixteenth century engraved itself so effectively onto popular memory.
4
 For generations to 
come, the division into ‘abbey time’ and the emptier years since would remain a reference-
point for people with little sense of numbered dates. And no surprise. The seizure of all 
monastic property by the Crown in 1536-40 was and remains the largest single transfer of 
landed wealth in English history. It also remains weirdly under-researched. The roots of the 
policy have been much debated (in short, greed sauced with humanist and evangelical distaste 
for monks), but its effects remain much less clear. This was partly because ‘the dissolution of 
the monasteries’ was a composite event made up of hundreds of local dissolutions, in which 
institutions whose local significance had varied hugely were destroyed in a range of different 
ways and were succeeded by a range of different arrangements. A few of the greatest abbeys 
became secular cathedrals; some became parish churches; more were simply parlayed into 
private ownership by a crown which burned through this unprecedented windfall so fast that 
it was facing bankruptcy again before the monasteries were five years dead. 
 Two effects of this on the wider population stand out. First, the destruction of the 
monasteries probably damaged England’s structures for social welfare more than any other 
single event has ever done. Most of the hospitals, education, employment and charity that the 
monasteries had provided simply disappeared. Royal promises to use parasitic monks’ wealth 
to aid the poor turned out to be worthless. In the upland regions of England, where parishes 
were large and the monasteries’ role had been that much more vital, the effect was 
catastrophic. Recent archaeological research on childhood mortality suggests that it leapt in 
the years around 1540 and remained high thereafter.
5
 And if the dissolution only served to 
accentuate and underline a set of adverse economic trends that were already underway, it also 
became a byword for them and the perceived injustices they represented. It is no coincidence 
that the largest and most dangerous mass rebellion of the age, the northern risings in the 
autumn of 1536 known collectively (and a little misleadingly) as the Pilgrimage of Grace, 
was sparked primarily by the Dissolution. As the regime had taught them, the Pilgrims bound 
themselves to their cause by means of an oath.
6
 Only now was England waking up to the fact 
it was in a new world. 
 Second, at least once the outmanoeuvred Pilgrims had been suppressed and it was 
clear that further resistance would be futile, the monasteries’ lay neighbours began to be 
drawn into the process. The greatest winners were the gentry, who ended up holding not only 
most of the former monastic lands, but also a series of legal rights that went with them. The 
majority of English advowsons – the legal rights to present priests to rectories, vicarages and 
other benefices – had belonged to monasteries. Now, bizarrely and almost by accident, these 
rights and responsibilities were transferred to the new owners of the land; and, even more 
bizarrely, this arrangement endured and endures even to the present. This looked to many at 
the time, and since, like a gross scandal, although from the new owners’ point of view it 
naturally seemed a little different. They were often longstanding patrons and benefactors of 
the religious houses they now owned, and sometimes saw some continuity between these two 
different forms of social leadership. And many of them continued to see their new duties to 
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the parish churches under their care as a solemn charge, to be executed faithfully. It at least 
justified their sudden enrichment.
7
 
But, as it became clear that the monasteries could not be saved, others too rushed to 
seize what they could for themselves from the communal ruin. Unless the royal 
commissioners managed to stop it, fabrics and furnishings were spirited away, roofs were 
stripped of lead, even the building-stones of the abbeys themselves disappeared in the night. 
In some cases, we know that this was intended as pious salvage, with particular relics, 
images, vestments or other precious items stored away in hope that the world would one day 
turn and increasingly-distant normality would return. But more often it seems to have been 
simply scavenging from the old Church’s corpse. What this means is still disputed: were such 
scanvengers imbruing their hands, too, in the blood, and so making themselves stakeholders 
in Henry’s Reformation? Or were they merely making pragmatic use of objects which the 
royal commissioners’ depredations had already desacralised? We do not know, but whether 
willingly or not, they were helping to ensure that the old world could not easily be restored.
8
 
Along with the monasteries, some other dominant features of England’s inherited 
religious landscape were destroyed in the late 1530s. Pilgrimages were suppressed, with all 
relics now being classed as idols and England’s premier shrine, that of Thomas Becket at 
Canterbury, being pulverised for memorialising a man now vilified as a traitor. Pardons and 
indulgences, the small change of the Catholic economy of salvation, were prohibited. Perhaps 
the most tedious regular obligation imposed on Christian laypeople, the Lenten fast, was 
relaxed by royal proclamation. The English Bible, long banned because of its association 
with the Lollards, was not only legalised but, in 1538, ordered to be placed in every parish 
church so that all comers might read it. Rumours spoke of more to come. Would priests be 
allowed to marry? Would parish churches be seized like the monasteries had been? Surely the 
new royal order to make a record of all baptisms, marriages and burials could only portend 
onerous taxes? 
Instead, in the early 1540s, as Henry VIII made it clear his Reformation was not going 
to go much further, an illusory stability appeared. In many parish churches, not much had 
changed. The Mass continued in all its traditional glory, albeit a new English-language litany 
was introduced in 1544. Heretics continued to suffer reassuringly traditional deaths. The 
many English people who wished to convince themselves that England’s religion was 
basically unchanged could still do so, albeit with some effort. When Henry VIII made an 
emotional appeal to his Parliament at Christmas 1545 for religious unity, lamenting that his 
subjects were quarreling about religion and labelling one another heretics and papists by turn, 
it was possible to hope that the unity of which he spoke might materialise. For whatever else 
had been shaken, one feature of England’s unofficial religion had been powerfully reinforced 
by the events of the previous decade: the king’s own authority. Henry VIII had given his 
subjects ample reason to doubt his good faith and piety, but not enough to outweigh the 
deeply entrenched national faith in good lordship, a faith which the regime bolstered with a 
canny mix of idealistic propaganda, nationalist drum-beating and carefully calibrated acts of 
exemplary violence. 
In fact, the quarrelsome nation which he described was going to become and to 
remain England’s new reality. The most fundamental change wrought by the Reformations 
which he started was one which neither he nor any of the other leading protagonists wanted: a 
nation which had been unified in religion became divided by it. The remainder of the story of 
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the Reformations is one of how those divisions were negotiated and how the lives of the men 
and women who took the different paths now open to them were changed in the process. 
  
* 
 
The illusory stability of Henry VIII’s last years gave way to a decade and a half of 
bewildering, switchback religious lurches, a string of crises which made clear how much had 
in fact already changed. 
 Much of the chaos of Edward VI’s short reign (1547-53) owed little to his regimes’ 
radical religious policies, and much to the strains of a catastrophic war in Scotland and 
deeper, ongoing shifts of social and economic power towards the gentry. The social 
significance of religious change in this context was twofold. First, this was the period when 
religious change became impossible for even the wilfully uninformed to ignore. The Mass 
was progressively replaced with a series of English liturgies which changed the daily and 
weekly rituals of church life almost beyond recognition. The Tudor state’s insatiable greed 
for ecclesiastical property reached the parishes in earnest, stripping churches of their imagery, 
plate and furnishings, and closing the chantries which had maintained thousands of priests in 
parishes across the country. The religious space thus laid bare was filled, amongst other 
things, by officially-approved homilies which all parish clergy were required to read aloud to 
their people, an early modern equivalent of a radio broadcast which ensured that all English 
subjects were exposed to the new doctrines – if they listened, and if their priest read them in a 
manner which made it possible for them to do so. 
 The rage which this provoked in one of England’s most traditionally rebellious 
regions, the south-western peninsula, is well known: in the summer of 1549, much of Devon 
and Cornwall rose in rebellion against the successive changes in general and the new Book of 
Common Prayer in particular. What is remarkable, however, is how limited this response 
was. Very few of those English people whom we know, or suspect, loathed what was being 
done to their Church did anything about it. Although print censorship all but collapsed in 
1547-9, very few religious conservatives had anything published. There was foot-dragging 
and passive resistance to a point, but precious few seem to have had the stomach for a 
confrontation. Some had already been bought off, or at least compromised. Most of those 
who had reconciled themselves to Henry VIII’s changes had thereby already gone too far to 
turn back. Some of what little evidence we have suggests that a lethal fatalism had settled 
onto English conservatism. Nothing could now be done, except wait for the young king to 
come of age, hoping and trusting that he would put things right. The truth – that the Tudor 
kings were the root of the problem, not a part of the solution – was sufficiently unwelcome 
that most of their subjects’ minds shied away from it.9 
 Instead, for many, the combination of social and religious change was read in a 
second, surprising way. The matter of the ‘commonwealth’ was a major theme of evangelical 
preaching: lamenting the growing economic woes of the age, and diagnosing them as moral 
failings. This rhetoric had started outside the state establishment, with the many evangelicals 
who felt the waves of seizures of church property to be somewhere between a missed 
opportunity and mere robbery. With the new reign, some of those same evangelicals had 
come into the regime but had refused to moderate their views, and some of those at the heart 
the regime itself had taken a similarly idealistic stance. Whether sincerely or cynically, they 
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managed to stake out a decent claim to the moral high ground. As a result, when, in the 
desperate summer of 1549, there was unrest driven by enclosure and other socio-economic 
grievances across most of southern and midland England, many of the ‘campers’ who 
assembled to press their demands aligned themselves with, not against, reforming religion. 
They borrowed its language to appeal to the regime, and they heard its preachers at their 
encampments. Again, how sincere any of this was is beyond our knowing, but it is the first 
tangible sign of what would come. The English, or many of them, would find a way of 
building a new identity around this religion and of making it work for them.
10
 
 First, there would be a new set of crises and a tantalising alternative. For all the 
emerging enthusiasm for the new religion and the helpless confusion of the old, there is little 
doubt that the restoration of Catholicism under Mary I (1553-8) was both popular and on 
course to succeed. A huge and genuinely impressive effort to rebuild the material fabric of 
parish Catholicism achieved an extraordinary amount in a short time, especially given that 
these were years of dearth, war and epidemics. But the clock could not simply be turned 
back. There had been too much looting and destruction, and the new owners of the monastic 
lands would only consent to the Catholic restoration once their right to keep their ill-gotten 
gains had been protected. For that and other reasons, English Catholicism was not so much 
restored as re-created in this reign, with the new spiritualities and disciplines of what would 
become the Counter-Reformation beginning to make themselves felt.
11
  
 The sudden end of the restoration and the return to Protestantism, with the death of 
Mary and the accession of Elizabeth I in 1558, cut this process short. Aside from the 
tantalising might-have-beens, the Marian interlude had lasting consequences. Any prospect of 
a new, Protestant religious unity was now gone. The religious conservatives who had been 
left voiceless and bewildered by Edward VI’s Reformation had now rediscovered their steel. 
Those who had once been lured into abandoning the Papacy by intertia and loyalty to the 
Tudor crown would not make the same mistake again. A small but self-confident minority of 
determined Roman Catholics now remained in England, and for all that subsequent centuries 
of persecution, discrimination and prejudice could throw at them, they would persist. Around 
them and to some extent sustaining them was a larger periphery of sympathisers whose 
outward confirmity to the established Protestant church was half-hearted or, indeed, wholly 
cynical. 
 A similar splintering was emerging at the other end of the spectrum. The Marian 
regime had tried to deal with England’s stubborn minority of earnest Protestant converts by 
intimidating its leaders into recantation or driving them into exile. Both policies only half-
worked. Some prominent Protestants did recant, but many more stuck to their guns: for them, 
too, the battle-lines now seemed far clearer than before. The regime was eventually 
compelled to follow through on its threats, and between 1555-56 a swathe of imprisoned 
bishops, clerics and theologians were executed. Those who had escaped to exile, meanwhile, 
organised an impressive campaign of printed propaganda which the regime struggled to 
control; they also, in the pressure-cooker of exile and exposed to the heat of Protestant 
Reformations more full-blooded than England’s, were fired with new zeal. All this ensured 
that the purge did not end with the leaders. From 1556-58 the regime was rounding up and 
burning underground congregations of clandestine Protestants from London, Kent, Essex and 
elsewhere. Some three hundred died in all. 
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 Given a few more years, these policies might well have stamped out English 
Protestantism, but in the event they only angered it. The memory of the persecutors’ cruelty 
and of the martyrs’ heroism was cherished and burnished. More than merely a byword, it 
became the keystone of an emergent national myth of Catholic cruelty. As an ever-loyal 
nation swung behind the lead of its new queen, it learned that murdering good English men 
and women was what Catholics did, a lesson which it was slow to forget. It has been said that 
although England became a Protestant nation under Elizabeth I, it did not then, or indeed 
ever, truly become a nation of Protestants. It did, however, become and remain – far beyond 
the period covered by this volume – a nation which knew it hated and feared Catholics.  
 Not that this made even that anti-Catholic majority united. If the Marian regime did 
not succeed in exterminating the Protestants  which it exiled and persecuted, it did succeed in 
splitting them. The exiles, forced to forge their own path, split bitterly between those who 
believed it best to remain in lockstep with each other and with the orderly Reformation of 
Edward VI, and those who wished to dash to a more complete renewal of their religious lives 
without waiting for the laggards to catch up. In 1558-9 they brought this unresolved quarrel 
home with them, where it became overlaid on another: what was to be done about those who 
had conformed to Mary’s restoration, but who now claimed to be good Protestants? Surely 
those who had faced death or exile for their faithful witness could not simply keep company 
with such fainthearted turncoats as if nothing had happened? Did they not need to repent of 
their complicity, and demonstrate their good earnest by pressing the Reformation forward?
12
 
Hence the split between the new would-be centrist establishment Protestants, ‘moderate’ in 
the sense that they were as keen to bridle enthusiasm as to spur on laggards; and those who 
quickly came to be labelled ‘Puritans’, whose determination to purge the English Church of 
its popish remnants was a sign that they did not truly believe that the establishment’s religion 
was sincere or reformed at all. The battle-lines thus formed would divide English religion for 
generations to come. 
 
* 
 
The quarter-century of turmoil from 1534-59 was followed by eighty years of formal 
religious stability, which only broke down with the political crisis of 1640 and the subsequent 
Civil Wars. The social history of the Reformations during this long period of supposed peace 
is, therefore a matter of how the religious divisions thrown up by the preceding era worked 
their way through English society at large, and what effect they had on the way. 
 It has been traditional to see the great drama of this period as the struggle between 
Puritans and an establishment Protestantism which has sometimes, anachronistically, been 
labelled Anglicanism. This is a myth which has suited partisans who claim their descent from 
both parties, and like most myths it has some truth to it. From the 1560s onwards, and with 
increasing urgency through the 1570s and 1580s, a broad party of self-consciously 
‘advanced’ Protestants pressed for Elizabeth’s Reformation to be purged of its remaining 
popish structures and rituals, only to be stymied at every turn. The regime – above all the 
queen herself – refused to yield an inch to opponents who, if they could, would plainly have 
taken a mile. Petitions and policy proposals were stonewalled. Attempts to build a Puritan 
church from the ground up in regions like East Anglia, by bringing groups of like-minded 
ministers together to support one another and (informally) to build the kind of structures of 
collective self-governance typical of Calvinism, were blocked and at times fiercely 
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suppressed. In 1588, Puritan impatience boiled over with a published set of viciously 
satirical, populist attacks on the corruption and hypocrisy of the bishops, under the pen-name 
Martin Marprelate. This provoked a determined counter-attack in which Puritanism was 
effectively stamped out as a public presence within the Elizabethan church. It remained, 
however, as a stubborn and vocal minority of malcontents through the 1590s and the reign of 
James I (1603-25), who contained it but turned a blind eye to it. However, his son, Charles I, 
pushed for a more thoroughly Anglican discipline, enforcing this policy with more zeal than 
discretion. This, and secular discontent with his (mis)rule, stirred up a hornet’s nest of 
opposition in both England and Scotland which eventually brought England’s unprecedently 
long civil peace to an end. 
 The difficulty with this narrative is that no such clearly defined parties as Puritans 
existed. It is true that many who clearly had puritan tendencies liked to think of themselves as 
a small, persecuted minority at odds with the mass of the godless around them, but it is also 
clear that this was a theological rather than a sociological opinion. These were people who 
were doctrinally conditioned to see themselves as a faithful remnant, a small portion of God’s 
elect amongst a reprobate mass, and we should not mistake rhetorical claims that scarce one 
person in a hundred was saved for sober attempts to provide accurate statistics.
13
 In fact, the 
evidence increasingly suggests that some puritan characteristics spread themselves very 
widely in English society, at least by the end of the sixteenth century. ‘Anglican’, by contrast, 
is an anachronistic category which virtually all historians of the pre-Civil War period now 
take care to avoid. How we should think about the obedient, conformist Protestantism that 
became England’s default is not so clear. 
 The traditional category of ‘puritan’ can only be used to define the earnest, Calvinistic 
Protestantism which became firmly rooted in England by the late sixteenth century if we 
broaden its meaning considerably.
14
 For at the same time as puritan agitators were banging 
their heads against the brick wall of royal intransigence, others were quietly cultivating their 
own godly gardens. Richard Greenham, vicar of the tiny Cambridgeshire hamlet of Dry 
Drayton from 1570 onwards, was a puritan of another kind. The further Reformation he had 
in mind was not institutional but pastoral and spiritual: changing ordinary Christians’ lives 
through the work of painstaking parish ministry. A stream of idealistic students from 
Cambridge came to live and work alongside Greenham for a few months at a time, gaining 
informal apprenticeships in godly pastoring. And while he became one of the best-known of 
those who were working to build a truly Protestant England from within the established 
Church, he was not alone. A generation of earnest, idealistic but clear-sighted ministers who 
grew up with him also put their shoulders to the wheel. The project was that England’s 
Reformation would be completed retail, soul by soul, rather than wholesale through changes 
to its laws. If Greenham was the morning-star of this quiet second Reformation, its brightest 
ornament was William Perkins, a Cambridge theologian who, at his premature death in 1602, 
left a small library of terse, humane guides to Christian living which were translated across 
Protestant Europe, and a cohort of enthusiastic students and successors who turned his 
message into Jacobean England’s public orthodoxy.  
The most recent studies of both Greenham and Perkins have both denied that their 
subjects were Puritans at all, on the grounds that they largely conformed to and were 
undoubtedly loyal to the established Church of England.
15
 Whatever labels we choose to 
apply to them, it is certainly clear that the kind of religion they tried to inculcate seeped deep 
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into English life. And if idealistic ministers always saw the glass of popular religion as half-
empty, historians do not need to agree with them. Booksellers, at least, knew their were 
fortunes to be made selling anthologies of prayers, handbooks to pious living, and even 
printed sermons which inculcated a Calvinistic ‘practical divinity’ of Greenham and Perkins’ 
kind. Bishop Lewis Bayly’s The Practise of pietie, Directing a Christian how to walke that 
he may please God consists of over 800 pages of stodgy but earnestly practical advice on 
Christian living. Between its first publication in 1612 and the Civil War it ran through over 
fifty editions, some of them printed in cramped type on tiny pages so as to keep the price as 
low as possible.
16
 Other popular imprints which failed to reach Bayly’s sheer volume of sales 
made up the difference in variety and accessibility: moralising ballads imbued with Protestant 
principles, stirring tales of the Protestant martyrs, collections of prayers which used 
Protestant doctrines as their framework, advice on household management which presumed a 
self-consciously Protestant piety. If the Protestantism on display was sometimes a little rough 
and ready, its assumptions and patterns of thought also pervaded these texts. Insofar as we 
can reconstruct lists of best- and steady-selling religious imprints, such unabashedly 
Protestant texts dominate them.
17
 
Other evidence points in the same direction. The sermon, advanced Protestantism’s 
chosen medium of religious change: recent scholarship has made clear how widespread, 
carefully constructed and rhetorically effective post-Reformation preaching became, and also 
how it came to be valued by parish communities which saw learned preaching as a point of 
local prestige.
18
 Music: Protestant scepticism drove traditional polyphonic church music to a 
few traditionalist redoubts (mostly cathedrals and collegiate churches), but in its place 
introduced a new phenomenon, singing of metrical psalms in ‘Geneva style’ (that is, men and 
women in unison). As its traditionalist opponents worried, this turned out not only to be 
hugely popular but to be a Trojan horse for sometimes aggressively Protestant 
presumptions.
19
 The household: against a long-standing presumption that English 
Protestantism’s rejection of religious imagery in worship extended to a general suspicion of 
all visual images, we now know how Biblical and other explicitly Protestant visual imagery 
pervaded the decoration both of private homes and of public spaces such as inns.
20
 Religious 
practice itself: what we know about the patterns of public, family and solitary prayer amongst 
post-Reformation Protestants belies any sharp division between Puritan and conformist 
Protestants. ‘Conformists’ fasted, wept for their sins, and pursued fervour and zeal in their 
religious exercises. ‘Puritans’ embraced such traditional-seeming practices as making pious 
vows; used set forms of prayer, including the Book of Common Prayer, in their private 
devotions; and found spiritual comfort in the ministry of the established Church.
21
 
Undoubtedly some English Protestants could be described either as puritans or as anti-
puritans, some of the time at least. But rather than attempting to divide the nation into these 
parties, we would do better to heed the words of one of the period’s foremost historians: 
‘zealous Protestantism could . . . be a popular religion’.22 
 Was there a way of being a zealous Protestant which did not tend towards puritanism? 
Clearly, yes – a small avant-garde of ceremonialist clerics and traditionalist laypeople were 
exploring this throughout the period, and with new gusto and royal encouragement from the 
                                                          
16
 Green, Print and Protestantism 348-51. 
17
 Watt, Cheap print; Walsham, Providence. 
18
 Hunt, Art of Hearing 
19
 Ryrie, Psalms 
20
 Hamling, Decorating the godly household. 
21
 Ryrie, Being Protestant. 
22
 Walsham, Providence 325. 
1620s onwards. Some such people were, as their opponents alleged, undoubtedly flirting 
either deliberately or unawares with Catholicism, whose rich spirituality continued to have an 
appeal and which both won and lost converts throughout this period.
23
 But generally, this was 
a libel. There is a case for arguing that the new English church built up a level of genuine 
mass allegiance from people who were not drawn by the Calvinist doctrines which had 
become their preachers’ orthodoxies. If this is so, loyalty to the new English liturgy, the Book 
of Common Prayer which puritan campaigners wanted so badly to reform, was at its heart. If 
England cannot be divided into Puritans and conformists, it can perhaps be divided into Bible 
Protestants and Prayer Book Protestants. Certainly, when the Church of England was 
dismantled by the wartime Parliament in the 1640s, its defenders found that the Prayer Book 
was their most popular cause, and although the use of the book was formally illegal 
throughout the later 1640s and 1650s, it continued to be very widespread.
24
 
 What this religion meant to its adherents remains the great mystery. Conformity, by 
its nature, does not leave much mark on the record, and a religion which is almost defined by 
praying in set words tends not to speak for itself. We may see a glimpse of it from outside in 
a jaundiced but sharply-observed portrait painted by a popular puritan author, Arthur Dent, in 
his bestselling 1601 book The plaine mans path-way to heauen.
25
 Like others before him who 
had tried to describe the so-called ‘country divinity’, the religion of the uneducated layman in 
Protestant England, Dent was acerbic on the subject. His book consists of a lengthy dialogue 
between three idealised types: a Protestant minister in the Greenham-Perkins mould (backed 
up by a zealous layman), an ‘ignorant man’ of goodwill but of corrupt religion, and a 
‘caviller’ or malicious fault-finder. After nearly four hunded pages of conversation, the 
ignorant man is converted and the caviller departs, sour and, to Dent, evidently Hell-bound. 
 The ignorant man, however, initially jibs at the religion his more self-consciously 
pious neighbours recommend: 
If a man say his Lords praier, his Ten Commandements, and his Beliefe, and keepe 
them ... no doubt he shall be saued, without all this running to Sermons, and pratling 
of the Scripture. ... As long as I serue God, and say my praiers duly, and truely, 
morning and euening, and haue a good faith in God, and put my whole trust in him, 
and doe my true intent, and haue a good minde to God-ward, and a good meaning; 
although I am not learned, yet I hope it will serue the turne for my soules health. 
Working men who lack the leisure or inclination to bury themselves in the Bible ‘cannot liue 
by the scriptures: they are not for plaine folke, they are too high for vs’. In any case, he adds 
almost in passing, he cannot read.
26
 Two decades earlier another zealous pastor, George 
Gifford, had painted a similar portrait of what he called ‘the Countrie diuinitie’. Gifford’s 
plain man liked a modicum of preaching – especially if the preacher could quote learned 
doctors in Latin – but believed that the Prayer Book service and the official Homilies were 
‘as good edifying’ as any sermon. And he disliked moralising busybodies who believed 
Christians should ‘sitte mooping alwayes at their bookes’.27 
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 ‘This age,’ Dent’s minister commented, ‘is full of such carnall Protestants’, and 
although we might prefer the designation Prayer Book Protestants, we might well agree.
28
 We 
might also wonder what else the religion of the illiterate could have been. Again, however, 
we should beware of the Calvinistic inclination to separate sheep from goats. The claim that 
the world was divided sharply between the godly and the ignorant was preachers’ rhetoric, 
not sociological analysis. And whereas in 1581 Gifford’s country-divine rejected his godly 
neighbour’s entreaties, in 1601 Dent’s ignorant man decided to embrace the learning he was 
offered. Along with the continued affection that many undoubtedly zealous Bible-Protestants 
continued to feel for the Prayer Book, this is a sign that, if we must draw lines here, we 
should not do so too sharply. Zealous Protestantism, of the kind that was often labelled 
puritan, was a diverse and expansive – not to say quarrelsome – category. By the turn of the 
century, it had become the most readily available model of what Christian piety meant for 
most English people. Ministers wanted their people to define their entire lives by it, and so 
naturally were disappointed. But its reach into national religious life was far more pervasive. 
 
* 
 
What of those whom we cannot place on this establishment Protestant-puritan continuum? 
For at least three main groups of English people lay beyond it. 
 The most obvious were the Catholics – whether ‘church papists’, who conformed to 
the law to various degrees,
29
 or open recusants, who refused to conform to the established 
Church and faced a series of consequences ranging from fines, discrimination and civil 
disabilities to, in extremis, exile or execution. England was openly at war with Spain from 
1585-1604, and unofficially so for a decade or more before, and during this period Catholics 
were easily seen as foreign agents: the bulk of the killings, both of missionary priests and of 
their lay protectors, fell during those years. The Gunpowder Plot of 1605 ensured that peace 
did not bring an outbreak of tolerance. The struggle for England’s Catholic community was 
not merely to negotiate these very real practical dangers, but to forge a sense of what its own 
identity might be. Its exiled leaders, training and sending back the missionary priests into 
terrible danger, were naturally inclined to confrontation, openly denying the legitimacy 
especially of Elizabeth I’s regime and pressing for Catholics to rebel. In 1569, some of them 
in England’s North-East had done so, supporting two earls who proposed to replace the queen 
with her Catholic cousin Mary, queen of Scots. The revolt was a fiasco which crumbled at the 
first show of strength from the regime, and which was followed by a deliberately bloody 
programme of exemplary reprisals.  
After that, rebellion was a dream, dependent on various imagined ex machina 
interventions which never appeared. And so for most of those Catholics who remained in 
England, the exiles’ purism seemed self-defeating. A highly visible slice of England’s high 
nobility remained stubbornly but discreetly Catholic. They and their affinities pioneered what 
would eventually become the mainstream view of English Catholics, that is, they insisted on 
their political loyalty to the English throne and state and argued that it was compatible with 
their spiritual allegiance to Rome. In the wake of the Gunpowder Plot, James I attempted to 
exploit this by imposing a new oath of allegiance on Catholics, which disavowed any belief 
that popes may depose or excommunicate kings. Theologically it was almost impossible for 
Catholics to accept this. The oath was therefore in one sense a success, in that it made the 
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Catholic clergy look extreme while expressing the view which many lay Catholics already 
held. However, as the sense of immediate danger receded in the 1610s and 1620s, and 
especially once Charles I’s marriage to a Catholic princess had established a public Catholic 
household in the heart of London, the project of splitting, isolating and exposing English 
Catholicism no longer seemed so urgent. A new reality was becoming clear: English 
Catholicism had stabilised. It was not going to surge back to retake the country, despite 
puritan scaremongering to that effect. Nor was it going to die out. In some families and some 
regions – notably the North-West – it was deeply entrenched. And as is often the case with 
stable religious minorities, once a generation or two of both fears and hopes have turned out 
to be groundless, both sides of the divide began to relax and adapt themselves to a new 
normal. 
 No such relaxation was apparent with regards to a smaller but more threatening 
minority: Protestant radicals and separatists. Since the reign of Henry VIII England had been 
subject to periodic panics about ‘Anabaptists’, who would supposedly tear up all godly 
society and sound doctrine to replace it with profanity, polygamy, equality, common 
ownership of goods, rebellion and slaughter. The bloody disaster of the apocalyptic 
Anabaptist kingdom established in the German city of Münster in 1534-5 remained a staple 
of alarmist English preaching into the mid-seventeenth century and beyond. In fact, at least 
for the first century of the Reformation, this remained a largely imaginary threat. A handful 
of supposed Anabaptists, many of them foreigners, were burned as heretics by successive 
regimes: the last two died in 1612. There was also a considerable panic in the early 1580s 
about a secretive, mystical sect of Dutch origins, the Family of Love, which had certainly 
built up networks of sympathisers in Cambridgeshire and elsewhere, but which panic and 
paranoia began to spot everywhere.
30
 The significance of these episodes is not the presence of 
tiny numbers of sectarians, but the fear which they generated in the rest of society. With 
hindsight we can see that this fear was excessive, but the far boundary of the Calvinist 
settlement was less clearly defined than it can look in retrospect. The possibility of the 
Reformation leaking into a welter of chaotic radicalism was real, and indeed, in the mid-
seventeenth century, it would happen. The sixteenth century’s panicky overreactions may 
have averted a genuine threat. 
 That is not to say, however, that the far boundary of the Reformation remained secure. 
Nor is it simply that Protestantism’s discursive and quarrelsome nature threw up some highly 
idiosyncratic individuals as a matter of course.
31
 Predictably enough, the repeated puritan 
disappointments of the 1570s and 1580s drove a handful of radicals to abandon hopes for a 
comprehensive national Reformation and instead to press ahead on their own. These 
separatists, often named Brownists for one of their most prominent early leaders, also 
remained small in number, and – given the hostile legal environment – tended to slip into 
exile in the Netherlands and elsewhere. It was such a group of separatist exiles in the 
Netherlands who took the lead in establishing the colony in Massachusetts in 1620: tellingly, 
they preferred the appalling hardships and risks of a transatlantic crossing to a brutally hostile 
environment to the danger that they might ‘lose our language and our name, of English’.32  
The New England experiment made plain, however, that these formal separatists were 
the tip of a much larger iceberg. The phenomenon of what Patrick Collinson has called ‘semi-
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separatism’ was pervasive in puritan circles by the end of Elizabeth’s reign: a kind of puritan 
echo of the church papists, conforming to the established religion but with a whole series of 
voluntary structures, meetings and disciplines alongside it. In many cases these self-imposed 
structures, rather than the officially approved ordinances, became the heart of such people’s 
religion.
33
 They tended to maintain that this was compatible with being loyal members of the 
Church of England, and, indeed, that they were truer to its proclaimed principles than most 
others. The hierarchy, and many of such people’s neighbours, found an excess of enthusiasm 
no more welcome than open foot-dragging. Which view was correct is a matter of opinion, 
and partly depends on how the denouement is interpreted. As the definition of conformity 
was narrowed and its enforcement was stepped up in the late 1620s and 1630s, the dilemmas 
of the semi-separatists became sharp. Possibly as many as 20,000 emigrated to New England 
in that period, choosing danger and hardship as the only way of remaining faithful both to 
their consciences and their king.
34
 Many of those who remained at home felt the tug of open 
opposition. Small conventicles of Baptists, antinomians and other radical groups began to 
emerge in London and elsewhere in the 1630s.
35
 And when the established Church’s 
discipline collapsed after 1640s, a welter of Independent and then other, more radical groups 
emerged into the open. Did this prove that the establishment was right to use a degree of 
repression to keep order? Or did it show that, in the end, the repression of the Laudian 
Church was counter-productive? 
 One question which remains unsolved is how, and whether, the repeated panics about 
separatism and radicalism connect with another, rather bloodier set of panics about dangerous 
religious dissidence. England’s involvement with the great witch-hunt of the early modern 
period was marginal. As was the case in many larger, more law-governed states, bureaucratic 
procedures tended to prevent local rumours and temporary panics translating into large-scale 
purges. Our records of witch-prosecutions are poor, and give us systematic coverage only of 
the Home Counties. Some fifty convicted witches were hanged in Essex, with cases peaking 
in the 1580s, and with four times as many acquittals as convictions. The numbers are much 
smaller but the pattern similar in other counties. Perhaps a few hundred died across the 
country as a whole, overwhelmingly women. For the most part, this seems primarily to reflect 
long-established patterns of popular belief in malign magic. The novelty, both in England and 
elsewhere, was that suspected witches were now being put on trial, with new laws passed to 
criminalise various magical acts in 1542, 1563 and 1604. For some theologians – Catholic 
and Protestant alike – this piecemeal approach, focusing on witches who had used magic to 
inflict tangible harm, was profoundly mistaken: witches’ fundamental crime was devil-
worship, and they should be hunted down as heretics rather than being dealt with as common 
felons.
36
 As recent scholarship the on far bloodier witch-hunts in central Europe has 
suggested, this view arose from the experience of hunting down and rooting out Anabaptist 
and other radical groups, who, like witches, were seen as having been in league with the 
devil.
37
 Whether this view had an impact in the English setting is a question that has, as yet, 
scarcely been asked. One intriguing straw in the wind is that England made the most robustly 
sceptical contribution to the continent-wide debate over witchcraft in this era: Reginald 
Scot’s Discouerie of Witchcraft (1584) argued bluntly that witchcraft was a fiction, conjured 
into being by credulous fears and, implicitly, popish superstition. The book was roundly 
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condemned on all sides. Intriguingly, Scot has been linked – suggestively, not decisively – to 
the Family of Love. 
 As Scot argued, the paranoid suspicions which led some English people to see witches 
under every bed were no better-founded than the parallel fear of English Anabaptists. The 
same is not necessarily true of the third and last category of religious dissenters, who were 
the focus of equally vivid fears: atheists. The English word ‘atheist’ was coined in 1561, and 
entered common parlance so quickly that it was clearly filling a need. Anti-atheist polemic 
became a distinct genre by the early seventeenth century. Whether the phenomenon it was 
attacking existed in any sense is less clear. A handful of outspoken freethinkers, or 
blasphemers, can be assembled, but there is no real hint of consistent or serious atheism, or 
even deism, in England before the mid-seventeenth century. There were certainly believers – 
often the most earnest and serious believers – who found themselves tempted to doubt such 
core Christian doctrines as the inspiration of Scripture, the immortality of the soul and the 
incarnation of Christ, although naturally we only tend to hear of such private struggles with 
doubt once the doubters had resolved them in favour of orthodoxy.
38
 The most widespread 
form of ‘atheism’, however, was what William Perkins called ‘the common Atheisme that is 
in the world’, meaning those who lived ‘as if there were no God’.39 Such people might not 
only openly profess orthodox Christianity, they might actually believe themselves to be 
believers. Yet their actions, as a string of clerics warned, told another story.  
 Much of this is simple moralising, but it should be taken seriously at least to this 
extent. Arthur Dent’s characterisation was right: if some of England’s carnal Protestants were 
like his ‘ignorant man’, that is, at least willing to be pious according to their own lights, 
others clearly were like his ‘caviller’, whose main interest in religion was that it leave them 
alone. So it perhaps always was and will be, but in post-Reformation England the social 
environment was unprecedently friendly towards ‘cavillers’. The formal requirements which 
the English Church laid on its people were minimal, certainly by comparison both to the 
medieval past and to the confessional Protestant states forming elsewhere in Europe. The 
English no longer had to fast (for even the remaining Lenten laws were widely flouted), nor 
was there social pressure to support the Church with substantial gifts of money, goods and 
time as once there had been. There was no arduous disciplinary structure imposed. All that 
was needed was occasional physical presence at church, which need not involve ever 
attending a sermon. An unprecedented space for mere withdrawal from religious life had 
opened up. The ferocious religious quarrels of the age did not necessarily convince all 
observers that one party was right and the others wrong. If there was no open and avowed 
‘atheism’, the authors of diatribes were perhaps right that a creeping secularisation and 
irreligion was beginning to pervade England’s spiritual life. And perhaps that is the way such 
change always comes: as a social reality before, a generation or two later, the theorists arrive 
to catch up with and to justify what has already begun to unfold. If so, then in this sense, too, 
the English Reformations were not a matter of replacing Catholic England with Protestant 
England, but of ensuring that the English would never again be a nation united under the 
same God. 
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